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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
in the instant case errored in blindly following the general rule
without investigating the reason behind it. Inconsistency is
the sole basis for the rule, because an inconsistent determina-
tion by the same jury necessarily reflects some defect in its
function. Here there was no determination by the jury as to
the defendant's guilt and thus there was no inconsistency.
PAUL M. BEEKS
EVIDENCE - COMPETENCY OF EXPERTS - EFFECT OF DIs-
CLAIMER BY THE WITNESS - The defendant was convicted of
indecently molesting a child; such conviction primarily based
on evidence given by an educated and experienced laboratory
technician. The trial court admitted her as an expert witness
and received her opinion that a slide prepared from a smear
taken from the child's body contained human sperm. The
technician stated that she felt the organism could have been
nothing else but human sperm, but she also stated that she
did not feel qualified to say whether it was human sperm or
not. The Supreme Court of South Dakota in reversing the
conviction held, two justices dissenting, that the admission
of such testimony constituted prejudicial error. The dissent
considered the evidence to be admissable and non-prejudicial;
its weight and value to be determined by the jury. State v.
Percy, 117 N.W.2d 99 (S.D. 1962).
A witness is established as expert and is qualified to give
an opinion when it is shown that he has special knowledge,
skill, experience, or training necessary to give an understand-
ing answer to the subject of inquiry.' Without this special
knowledge of the particular subject matter, the purported
expert opinion would be a mere guess or conjecture. 2 It is
expected that such testimony will aid the trier in the search
for truth3 Neither special professional license4 nor exper-
ience with identical circumstances 5 is required.
It is a general rule that the determination of a witness'
qualification and competency to speak is within the province
1. State v. Rtiff, 73 S.D. 467, 44 N.W.2d 126 (1950).
2. Gaddy v. Skelly Oil Co., 364 Mo. 143, 259 S.W.2d 844 (1953).
3. Woyak v. Konieske, 237 Minn. 213, 54 N.W.2d 649 (1952); State v.
Nelson, 103 N.H. 478, 175 A.2d 814 (1961).
4. Cordero v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 160, 297 S.W.2d 174 (1956).
5. Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953).
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of the trial court.6 Such a decision is reversible on appeal
only where there is a clear abuse of discretion' or where the
decision is erroneous as a matter of law.s Questions as to the
degree of expertness should go to the weight and not to the
sufficiency of the evidenceY
Where a witness is reasonably established as having the
qualifications of an expert his testimony can be considered
in such light even though he disclaims being an expert. 10 If
the evidence shows that a witness is qualified, even with a
disclaimer it is proper to submit the evidence for what it is
worth." The question of an individual's actual competency
as an expert witness is to be determined by the trial court
on the basis of evidence brought forth; not on the witness'
self-estimation of ability.12 If the witness disclaims qualifi-
cation and refuses to give an opinion, dismissal of the witness
by the trial court is a proper requirement," as apart from
other cases where in spite of the disclaimer the witness does
give testimony.
14
North Dakota recognizes the broad discretion of the trial
court in determining whether a witness is qualified to testify
as an expert, 5 and allows the admission of expert testimony
in spite of disclaimer.16
In the principal case reversal was based on disclaimer of
6. People v. Symons, 20 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Cal. 1962);'Boylai v. Board of
Comm'rs. of Cass County, 105 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1960); State v. Barry, 11 N.D.
428, 92 N.W. 809 (1902).
7. Cohen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1943); State v.
Riiff, 73 S.D. 467, 44 N.W.2d 126 (1950). A lower court ruling as to quali-
fications will not be disturbed unless there is no evidence that the witness
had qualifications of an expert.
8. Bratt v. Western Airlines, 155 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1946); Ottertail
Power Co. v. Malme, 92 N.W.2d 514 (N.D. 1958).
9. People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal. App. 2d 71, 363 P.2d 13, 14 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1961).
10. City of Bismarck v. Casey, 77 N.D. 295, 43 N.W.2d 372 (1950)
Although the witness disclaimed himself as an expert as to the question
before the court being cross-examined, the determination of the lower
court which admitted his testimony was affirmed.
11. Walker v. Scott, 10 Kan. App. 413, 61 Pac. 1091 (1900). "The fact that
the witness disclaimed being an expert will not preclude his testimony as
such, where the evidence of circumstances show that he possessed the
requisite qualifications."; Yates v. Garrett, 19 Okla. 449, 92 Pac. 142 (1907).
. . (S)ome of the witnesses . . . disclaimed that they were experts, yet,
when taken as a whole, their testimony shows they had had sufficient ex-
perience . . . it was proper and right for the court to admit their testi-
mony for what it was worth .. "
12. See Dobbs v. State, 191 Ark. 236, 85 S.,V.2d 694 (1935); Glover v.
State, 129 Ga. 717, 59 S.E. 816 (1907).
13. Reimers v. Petersen, 237 Iowa 550, 22 N.W.2d 817 (1946).
14. Glover v. State, 129 Ga. 717, 59 S.E. 816 (1907); Yates v. Garrett, 19
Okla. 449, 92 Pac. 142 (1907).. 15. Boylan v. Board of Comm'rs. of Cass County, 105 N.W.2d 329 (N.D.
1960); State v. Barry, 11 N.D. 428, 92 N.W. 809 (1902).
16. City of Bismarck v. Casey, 77 N.D. 295, 43 N.W.2d 372 (1950).
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the witness. Evidence showed she had sufficient qualifica-
tions to be deemed an expert, and she did give an express
opinion. It is submitted that a similar result in North Dakota
would be unlikely. To disallow the testimony in the principal
case would seem to be an overstep of proper judicial review.
The true question involved was the degree of expertness of
the witness, and as such it was a valid issue to be submitted
to the jury. The appellate court should not have so impaired
the proper exercise of discretion exercised in the lower court.
R. JON FITZNER
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION - VIDELICET - WILL USE OF
VIDLEICET DISPENSE WITH NECESSITY OF STRICTLY PROVING
AVERMENT MADE THEREUNDER? - The defendant was a
licensed package dealer in intoxicating liquors. A statute
provided that: "No licensee shall sell any intoxicating
liquor: (a) To any person under the age of twenty-one
years . . . . "- The information on which defendant was pros-
ecuted alleged that he "unlawfully sold intoxicating liquor, to
wit: one quart of Stillbrook whiskey." The trial court in-
structed the jury that the only question for them to decide
was whether or not defendant sold intoxicating liquor to the
minor and thus, in effect, it was not necessary to find that
he, in fact, sold Stillbrook whiskey. Defendant was convicted
and appealed. In reversing the decision the Supreme Court of
South Dakota held, one justice dissenting, that the state need
not have alleged that the liquor was Stillbrook whiskey; but
having done so, it became a matter of essential description
and must be proved. State v. Sudrala, 116 N.W.2d 243 (S.D.
1962).
In the quoted portion of the information above the alleged
fact preceded byi the words "to wit" is said to be "laid under a
videlicet. ' ' 2 That technical name is also given to "that is to
say"'3 and "namely."
4
At common law the allegation of a fact under a videlicet
1. S.D.C. § 5.0226(2) (1939).
2. People v. Shaver, 367 Ill. 339, 11 N.E.2d 400 (1937); Luka v. Behn,
225 Ill. App. 105 (1922).
3. Garrison v. City of Shreveport, 179 La. 605, 154 So. 622 (1934).
4. Taney County v. Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 361 Mo. 572, 235 S.W.2d 271
(1951). (The frequently used "viz." is an abbreviation of videlicet).
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